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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Section 78-2a-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended,
confers upon this Court appellate jurisdiction from District
Courts of this state in matters of review of final judgments of
this nature.
NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This Appeal is taken from the Order and Judgment of
Dismissal by the Honorable Raymond S. Uno in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
which judgment ended all claims of the City.
The Order and Judgment of Dismissal was entered on the 8th
day of April, 1988.

Notice of appeal was filed with the

District Court Clerk on the 5th day of May, 1988.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The following issues are presented for determination in this
appeal:
1.

Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law in

its construction of the state statutes and ordinances under
which development in this action was reviewed.
2.

Whether the District Court erred in relying on

inadmissible evidence and on evidence which was submitted in
violation of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
3.

Whether the District Court erred in failing to consider

evidence submitted by the City which created genuine issues of
material fact and in refusing to permit the City to conduct

1

discovery as required by Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
4.

Whether the presence of important public policy factors

mitigate in favor of reversal on appeal.
STATUTES, RULES AND ORDINANCES DETERMINATIVE OF ISSUES
The following enactments are determinative in this appeal:
1.

Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which

defines the requirements for summary judgment against a party.
Addendum 1A.
2.

Rule 6(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which

defines the timing for serving affidavits with motions.
Addendum IB.

Also, Rule 3(e) of the Rules of Practice in the

Third District Court, which limits the court from receiving
affidavits not filed according to the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
3.

Addendum 1C.

Section 10-2-418 of the Utah Code Annotated, which

restricts approval of "urban development" adjacent to municipal
boundaries.

Addendum ID.

Also, Section 10-1-104(11), Utah

Code Annotated, which defines the term "urban development."
Addendum IE.
3.

Section 19.84.090 of the Salt Lake County Ordinances,

which provides that conditional use permits cannot be granted
unless evidence is presented that the use conforms to the
intent of the

master plan and will be in the public interest.

Addendum IF.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The facts as appear unrefuted of record in this action are
as follows:
The Parties and their Interests
1.

Sandy City is a Utah municipality created to provide

urban governmental services essential for sound urban
development and for the protection of public health, safety and
welfare in residential, commercial and industrial areas, and in
areas undergoing development.
2.

Defendants Yeates, Priest, Kjar, Smoot, Postero-

Blecker ("Property Owners"), are property owners and developers
of a parcel of unincorporated territory ( the "Property") which
lies within one-half mile of Sandy City limits and within
territory the City has proposed for municipal expansion in its
policy declaration.
3.

Defendant Salt Lake County ("County") is a subdivision

of the state of Utah, organized and functioning under authority
of Title 17 of the Utah Code, and located in Salt Lake County.
Defendant County Planning Commission is a commission appointed
by the County and operating under authority of Chapter 27,
Title 17, of the Utah Code.
4.

Defendants Chevron and Postero-Blecker are

Pennsylvania and Arizona corporations, respectively, doing
business in the state of Utah,

3

The Property and Its Authorized Uses
5.

This action involves a single parcel of approximately

4.18 acres of commercial property ("Property") located on the
northwest corner of 10600 South and 1300 East, in
unincorporated Salt Lake County ("County").1

The Property

immediately abuts the municipal boundaries of Sandy City
("City"), and is located within an unincorporated "island"
within the limits of the City.
6.

Since its adoption in 1976, the County Master Plan for

the area has called for Rural Residential uses on the
Property.2

Sandy City plans also specify similar such uses.3

The Property has historically been zoned Residential (R-l-8)
consistent with both City and County plans.
7.

On August 5, 1987, at the request of the property

owner, the County amended its zoning to permit commercial
development (Commercial C-2 and Residential RM/zc)4 on the
Property.

The County master plan was not amended to account

1

Salt Lake County Commission minutes, August 5, 1987.

2

Little Cottonwood District Development Plan, 1976

3

The Cresent Citizens Report also recognizes noncommercial uses. See County Planning Commission minutes, May
12, 1987.
4

County Commission minutes, August 5, 1987

4

for this change.

For this and other reasons, the City objected

to the rezoning.5
8,

The City has adopted an Annexation Policy Declaration

under authority of state statute.6

The purpose of this Policy

is to declare the areas which the City is willing to annex. The
Property is within the area projected for expansion under that
Policy Declaration. The effect of the Policy Declaration is to
prohibit County approval of commercial development in excess of
$750,0007

on the Property, unless the Property Owners have

first attempted to annex.8

The Property Owners have not

attempted to annex.9
The Owners' Development Activities
9.

In 1987, the Property Owners purchased the Property

with express intention to develop a "commercial subdivision."10
5

County Commission minutes, August 5, 1987. On September
18, 1988, the City also requested that the County reconsider
its commercial zoning. That request was denied by the County
Commission on September 18, 1987. County Commission minutes,
September 30, 1987.
6

Verified Complaint, Exhibit "I."

7

This amount refers to "cost projections" for "any or all
phases" of development. Section 10-1-104(11), Utah Code
Annotated (Hereinafter "Utah Code").
8

Section 10-2-418, Utah Code.

9

Verified Complaint, para. 33

10

County Planning Commission minutes, April 28, 1987, and
County Commission minutes, August 5, 1987. The owners claim
that the commercial rezoning occurred prior to their purchase,
although they have introduced no evidence on this point. There
is no question, however, that the Owners knew that the
requested zoning contradicted the County Master Plan of the
City's objections prior to the rezoning. See Application for
5

The evidence is undisputed that the land value alone exceeds
$850,000.J1
10.

The Owners' development is in fact a multiphased

"commercial subdivision."

It's first phase is a Chevron

Service Complex and the second phase a McDonalds Restaurant.
There are also other phases of development on the property, the
specifics of which have not been disclosed by the Property
Owners.

However, costs of development in all phases will run

to millions dollars.
11.

There was substantial neighborhood resistance to their

development.12

The Owners made concessions .to residential

neighbors in order to minimize opposition.

One concession was

that the Owners would be the sole developers of the project and
that all construction would proceed as a single development.13
The owners were successful at overcoming some County and
community resistance through this and other means.
12.

On August 26, 1987, Defendant Postero-Blecker, on

behalf of Chevron, applied to Salt Lake County for a
Zoning, dated April 9, 1987, and County Commission minutes, of
August 5, 1987
11

Affidavit of Gary Free, MAI Appraisal.

12

County Planning Commission minutes, April 28, 1987, and
May 12, 1987
13

County Commission minutes, December 9, 1987 (Testimony
of Pam Delehanty), p. 1588. This concession was also
apparently made to satisfy County staff concerns that the
individual commercial tracts "should be developed as a unit and
not piecemeal." County Planning Commission minutes, April 28,
1987.
6

Conditional Use Permit for construction on approximately .7
acres of the Property.

Such a permit is required by Salt Lake

County ordinances for commercial development within this zone.
Such ordinances require that permit applications be made by the
"owners" of the Property.14

Neither Postero-Blecker nor

Chevron was the owner of the property at the time of
application or consideration by the District Court.
13.

The proposed project was a service station, convenience

store and car wash.

The Postero-Blecker application placed the

value of the development at $250,000.

However, uncontroverted

evidence before the District Court showed the actual value of
the .7 acre of land alone, to be $200,000 to $210,000.

The

costs of improvements are an additional $450,000 to $550,000.
That total cost range of $650,000 to $760,000, did not include
land values or improvement costs for the McDonalds Restaurant
or any other projects on the remaining 3.48 acres of the
Property.
14.

On about September 30, 1987 (approximately one month

after the Chevron application), the Property Owners, through
their agent, filed a second application for a conditional use.
This application was for a "McDonald's Restaurant" to be
located on the Property adjacent to and immediately to the
north of the Chevron Center.

McDonalds was not owner of the

property at the time of their applications or at any time prior
to initiation of this action.
14

Section 19.84.030, Salt Lake County Ordinances.,
7

15.

The application for this second (McDonalds) phase

specified the value of the project, including land, to be
$300,000.

However, the evidence before the County showed the

stand alone costs of the second phase to be $900,000 to
$1,100,000.15
County Approval of Phases One and Two
16.

On October 13, 1987, the County Planning Commission

approved the conditional use application for the first
(Chevron) phase, over objection by the City.16

On October 14,

1987, Sandy City appealed that decision to the Salt Lake County
Commission.
17.

On October 21, 1988, the County Commission denied the

City's request for appeal and upheld the Planning Commission
decision.17

The County Commission also entered findings of

fact over written objection by the City.
18.

On October 27, 1987, the County Planning Commission

approved the use application for the second (McDonalds) phase.
The City appealed that approval to the County Commission on
November 4, 1987.

On December 9, 1987, the County Commission

denied the City's appeal and approved the conditional use
application.

15

County Commission minutes, December 9, 1987

16

Planning Commission minutes, April 28, 1987 and May 12,

17

County Commission minutes, October 21, 1988

1987

8

Disposition in the District Court
19.

On November 6, 1987, Sandy City filed a verified

complaint in Third District Court to require compliance with
the foregoing requirements.

By letter dated November 19, 1987,

the City Attorney inquired of counsel for the Owners, of a
convenient date for deposition of Owner Yeates.
counsel did not respond to that inquiry.18

Defendant's

However, Answers

to the complaint were filed by the defendants in December 1987
and January 1988.
20.

Motions for summary judgment were filed by all

defendants in January, 1988.

On January 26, 1988, the City

responded with its own motion for summary judgment.

Motions by

the City and Chevron were accompanied by affidavits and
memoranda. The City filed a Motion to Strike certain portions
of defendant's affidavits and other documents and filed an
affidavit of counsel evidencing the need for additional
discovery time.19
21.

On February 5, 1988, the Court heard the motions for

summary judgment and Motion to Strike.

Counter affidavits were

filed by the City on the day prior to the hearing.

In

addition, during the hearing, Defendant Salt Lake County
submitted numerous documents to the court, without prior notice
18

Affidavit of Walter R. Miller, dated February 4, 1988

19

_Id. A copy of the Affidavit of Walter Miller is
attached as Addendum 2. A copy of the Motion to Strike is
attached as Addendum 3.
9

to the City.

The County evidence was received by the Court

over oral objection by the City and without inquiry as to "good
cause".20
22.

On February 25, 1988, Salt Lake County filed a Motion

for Certification of the Record which it had filed with the
Court at the hearing on summary judgment, together with
supplemental related documents, which motion was granted
23.

On March 15, 1988, the Court filed a Memorandum

Decision denying the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and
Motion to Strike and granting defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment and Salt Lake County's Motion for Certification.21

On

April 8, 1988, the Court entered its formal Order and Judgment
of Dismissal, which order forms the basis of this appeal.22
24.

On April 28, 1988, the City filed a Motion for

Injunction During Pendency of Appeal.

The motion was based in

part on affidavits showing that comprehensive development was
occurring on the entire Property and that the Property Owners
had conveyed the property to Chevron and McDonalds after the
motions for summary judgment had been heard.

That motion was

denied and the affidavits ordered stricken.

20

Transcript, pp. 21, 22, 27-29. The Court latter
ordered the record to be supplemented, certified, and indexed.
See Order Concerning Certification of Record, filed March 10, 1988
21

A copy of the Memorandum Decision is attached as
Addendum 4.
22

A copy of the Order is attached as Addendum 5.

10

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Summary judgment is a drastic remedy which should be granted
with reluctance.

For this reason, the decision of a trial

court to grant summary judgment must be reviewed in a light
most favorable to the opposing party and should be upheld only
if it appears that there was no genuine issue of any material
fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.
Summary judgment in this action did not comport with these
principles.

The following errors of law and fact were made by

the District Court:
Errors of Law. The trial court first erred as a matter of
law in interpreting Section 10-2-418 of the Utah Code.

That

section restricts commercial development within one-half mile
of a city when the cost projections for the development exceed
$750,000 for any and all phases.
The Court also erred failing to consider County ordinances
which restrict unincorporated area development where evidence
is not presented that the development will benefit the
community and conform to the intent of the master plan.
2o

Errors of Material Fact. The District Court erred in

relying on evidence which violated Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

That rule requires that affidavits

supporting summary judgment be made on personal knowledge and
set forth facts admissible in evidence.
11

The admission of

certain evidence also violated Rules 6(d) and Rule 56(c) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requiring that affidavits
supporting a motion for summary judgment be submitted with the
motion and requiring that affidavits opposing a motion be
submitted before the day of the hearing.
The City objected, in a Motion to Strike, to numerous
statements in Chevron's Motion for Summary Judgment and
supporting memorandum and affidavit.

These statements violated

Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and several of
the Utah Rules of Evidence.
The City also objected to numerous documents untimely
introduced by the County at hearing, without notice to the City
or showing of good cause.

Yet the court overruled the city's

objections and relied on this evidence in granting the
defendants' motion, particularly evidence as to the City's
willingness to annex, the value of the Chevron project, the
scope of the development, and the projected costs for the
entire development.
The District Court further erred in refusing to permit the
City further discovery as required by Rule 56(f) of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, as requested through a detailed affidavit
submitted by counsel for the City.
The Court also erred in failing to consider the following
evidence which created genuine issues of material fact:

12

a)

The City presented evidence that it had expressed its

willingness to annex the property.

The court concluded that

the City had only said it would only "consider" annexation.
b)

The City presented evidence that the value of the

Chevron project alone could exceed $750,000.

The court

concluded it could not.
c)

The City presented evidence that the Chevron project was

one phase of a larger development.

The court said that the

application of Chevron must be considered a single
development.
d)

The City presented evidence of that the projected cost

for the Chevron and McDonalds projects alone would exceed
$750,000, not including land.

The court concluded that even

the costs of Chevron and McDonalds combined could not exceed
$750,000.
e)

The City presented evidence that the County violated its

master plan and ordinances in zoning and granting the
Defendants' conditional use permit for the Chevron property.
The court found that the County acted properly.
Because of the foregoing errors of law and material fact,
and based on sound public policy factors, the decision of the
District Court should be reversed.

13

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN ITS
CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTES AND ORDINANCES APPLICABLE TO
THIS ACTION. SUCH MISINTERPRETATIONS WERE RELIED ON BY THE
COURT IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE CITY.
A. THE DISTRICT COURT MISINTERPRETED UTAH STATUTES IN A MANNER
TO PERMIT DEVELOPMENT IN UNINCORPORATED COUNTY TERRITORY WHEN
SUCH DEVELOPMENT IS EXPRESSLY FORBIDDEN BY THE STATE
LEGISLATURE.
Utah cities are created to provide urban governmental
services essential for sound urban development and for the
protection of the public in developed areas and those
undergoing development.

The principle means by which cities

extend their services to developing areas is through extension
of their boundaries.23
The state legislature has determined that city boundaries
should be extended, in accordance with statutory standards, to
include all areas of the state where a high quality of urban
services is needed and can be provided.

Annexations also serve

the legislative purpose of avoiding double taxation by counties
of city residents and discouraging the proliferation of service
districts.24
Utah statutes set the conditions for municipal annexation of
unincorporated territory.25

A City must have adopted an

23

Section 10-2-401, Utah Code

24

Id.

25

Section 10-2-515, Utah Code.
14

annexation policy declaration, the territory must conform to
state standards for annexation, and the annexation must meet
the standards set forth in the city's annexation declaration.26
Utah statutes also permit owners of land in unincorporated
areas to petition cities for annexation of their property.27
One legislative means of promoting annexation is to restrict
development along the unincorporated fringes of cities. The
legislature has strictly limited County approval of urban
development within one-half mile of a city in unincorporated
territory which the city has proposed for annexation in its
policy declaration.

Section 10-2-418, Utah Code Ann.,

specifically provides as follows:
Urban development shall not be approved or permitted
within one-half mile of a municipality in the
unincorporated territory which the municipality has
proposed for municipal expansion in its policy
declaration, if the municipality is willing to annex
the territory proposed for such development under the
standards and requirements set forth in this chapter;
provided, however, that a property owner desiring to
develop or improve property within the said one-half
mile area may notify the municipality in writing of
said desire and identify with particularity all legal
and factual barriers preventing an annexation to the
municipality. At the end of 12 consecutive months from
the filing with the municipality of said notice and
after a good faith and diligent effort by said property
owner to annex, said property owner may develop as
otherwise permitted by law. [Emphasis added]
Thus, the above statute restricts unincorporated "urban
development" within one-half mile of Sandy City, if 1) the City
26

Sweetwater Properties v. Alta, 622 P.2d 1178 (Utah
1981); also Doenges v. Salt Lake City, 614 P.2d 1237 (Utah 1980)
27

Section 10-2-416, Utah Code.
15

has proposed the area for expansion in its policy declaration,
and 2) Sandy is willing to annex the territory.
It is undisputed that the Property in this action is within
one-half mile of Sandy and that Sandy has proposed the area for
expansion in its policy declaration,,28

The Court,

nevertheless, erroneously concluded that the Property could be
developed without annexing.

The following factors formed the

basis of that decision:
1.

"Willingness" of City to Annex.

The District Court

first ruled that Sandy had never publicly declared that it
would annex the Property:
Sandy City has not clearly stated it would annex the
subject property, but only that it will consider
annexation. It was not until the present lawsuit was
filed that it indicated that it would annex the subject
property.29
The City had expressly declared its willingness to annex the
Property before initiation of the lawsuit.
fact was squarely before the Court.

Evidence of that

Sandy's Policy Declaration

identifies by map the unincorporated island in which the
Property is situated and declares "Islands to be annexed if
petitioned."30

Counsel for the City had also expressed the

City's "willingness" to annex directly to the County Planning
Commission.3 x
28

Annexation Policy Declaration

29

Memorandum Decision, p.2

30

Verified Complaint, Exhibit "I"

31

Planning Commission minutes, September 22, 1987
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But the court's error was not just a factual one.
misinterpreted the statute.

It also

It assumed that "willingness" to

annex must be officially declared in advance of annexation.
A city must be willing to annex in order for the development
restrictions to apply.

But the statute does not require the

City to declare such, outside of its Policy Declaration.

In

fact, the statute does not require "willingness" to be declared
at all.

The pretense that "willingness" must be "declared" is

a fiction of convenience, manufactured by counsel for
defendants.

For this reason, the District Court erred as a

matter of law in concluding that a declaration of willingness
must be made.
2.

That error requires reversal on appeal.

Definition of "Urban Development."

The District Court

also concluded that annexation was not required because the
Property was not "urban development."
"development" are in common usage.

The terms "urban" and

Fortunately, "urban

development" is also defined in statute.

Section 10-1-104(11),

Utah Code Ann. (1953), defines the term as follows:
"a housing subdivision involving more than 15
residential units with an average of less than one acre
per residential unit or a commercial or industrial
development for which cost projections exceed $750,000
for any or all phases." [Emphasis added]
The District Court erred twice in its conclusion that the
project was not urban development.

First, the Court assumed

that the value of building fixtures should not be considered in
determining cost projections.

However, cost projections for a

development include all costs from land acquisition to the
17

finished project.

In fact, "development" includes "any or all

undertakings necessary for planning, land acquisition,
demolition, construction, or equipment of a project."32
Second, the court erroneously assumed that each pad within a
project constitutes a separate development.

The facts before

the court were that the entire 4.18 acres were under single
ownership and that the entire tract, including Chevron and
McDonalds^ was a single "commercial subdivision."

Yet in

determining whether the defendants' development was "urban
development," the court said that "the application of Chevron
should be considered a single development."33
This interpretation is directly opposed to and defeats the
purpose of Section 10-2-418.

The definition of urban

development emphasizes that cost projections must include "any
or all phases."34
In including "all phases" in the definition, the legislature
wisely anticipated the kind of development being considered in
this case—one which is developed in multiple phases.

This

language is designed to prevent a developer, as in this case,
from circumventing the development statute by simply segmenting
or timing his projects.
The Court erred in considering only the first phase in
32

Dumonuchel

33

Memorandum Decision, p. 2

34

Section 10-1-104(11), Utah Code.

Dictionary of Development Terminology, 1975
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calculating total development costs.

That error requires

reversal as a matter of law.
B. THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER REQUIREMENTS OF THE
COUNTY ORDINANCES WHICH PROHIBIT DEVELOPMENT IN THE COUNTY
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS ACTION.
Salt Lake County has adopted specific standards for granting
a conditional use permit:
The planning commission shall not authorize a
conditional use permit unless the evidence presented is
such as to establish:
A. That the proposed use at the particular location
is necessary or desirable to provide a service or
facility which will contribute to the general wellbeing of the neighborhood and the community; and
B. That such use will not, under the circumstances
of the particular case, be detrimental to the health,
safety or general welfare of persons residing or
working in the vicinity, or injurious to property or
improvements in the vicinity; and
C. That the proposed use will comply with the
regulations and conditions specified in this title for
such use; and
D. That the proposed use will conform to the intent
of the county master plan.35
This ordinance states clearly that not only must each of the
standards for conditional use be met, but evidence must be
presented to show compliance.

An examination of the minutes

for the meetings at which the conditional use permit for
Chevron was discussed reveals that evidence was not introduced
to show the compliance of the Chevron phase.
No evidence was presented to show that a gasoline station at
on the subject property was consistent with the County's master
plan.

In fact, no such evidence could have been presented

because the proposed use is inconsistent with that plan.
35

Section 19.84.090, Salt Lake County Ordinances
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No evidence was presented to show that the proposed use
would benefit the community.

A general assertion was made by

Chevron's attorney that Chevron wanted the station.36
citizens also said they favored the project.37

Several

But the only

specific testimony was that adverse community impact would
result.38
The District Court seemed to understand that findings of
community benefit were required under County ordinance.39
However, the Court erred, as a matter of law, in concluding
that a finding of community benefit and conformity to the
master plan could be made under County ordinances, in the
absence of evidence and in the face of specific contradictory
testimony.

Such error is sufficient to justify reversal on

appeal.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
AND ON EVIDENCE WHICH WAS SUBMITTED IN VIOLATION OF THE
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
A. THE DISTRICT COURT DENIED THE CITY'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND
THEREAFTER RELIED ON INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE WHICH WAS THE
SUBJECT OF THAT MOTION AND WHICH FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 56(e) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
36

Planning Commission minutes, October 13, 1987

37

Planning Commission minutes, September 22, 1987 and
October 13, 1987
38

Planning Commission minutes, September 22, 1987
(Testimony of Kent Davis)
39

Memorandum Decision, p. 2, para 2
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Summary Judgment is a harsh remedy.40

Appropriately,

evidence submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment
must meet strict standards.

Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure defines those standards as follows:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would
be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all
papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or
opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or
further affidavits.41 [Emphasis added]
Evidence which does not meet the foregoing standards is
subject to a motion to strike.42

The Defendants submitted with

their motion for summary judgment an affidavit and a memorandum
which failed to conform to Rule 56(e).
filed a Motion to Strike.

Accordingly, the City

The District Court denied that

motion, and thereafter relied on critical evidence, subject of
the motion, which failed to comply with the requirements of
Rule 56(e) .
The following are examples of evidentiary errors by the
Court:
1.

Evidence of City "willingness" to Annex.

The District

Court relied on inadmissible assertions in concluding that the
40

Horsley v. Anaconda, 427 P.2d 390 (Utah 1967);
Controlled Receivables v. Harmon, 413 P.2d 807 (Utah 1966).
41

See also Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah

1977)
42

Howick v. Bank of Salt Lake, 498 P.2d 352, 353 (Utah 1972)
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City had "not clearly stated it would annex the subject
property".43

Chevron's Memorandum in Support of Motion for

Summary Judgment asserts:

"While the subject property lies

within Sandy City's policy declaration, Sandy City did not
express its willingness to annex the property as required by
statute."44
In fact, Chevron provided no evidentiary support for this
assertion.

Nor was there any other evidence before the Court

to support this conclusion.

The Chevron allegation was made

without knowledge, oath, or foundation.45
hearsay.46

It also constitutes

Such deficiencies formed the basis of the City's

Motion to Strike.
2.

Evidence as to value of the Chevron project.

The

District Court reached the following surprising conclusion as
to the value of the Chevron project:
"The value of the fixtures and personal property should
not be considered. The projected cost of the proposed
service station project is under $750,000."47
The Court apparently relied on Chevron's Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment for this conclusion.
That memorandum states:
43

Memorandum Decision, pe 2

44

Memorandum, pp. 14-15

45

Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

46

Rule 802, Utah Rules of Evidence.

47

Memorandum Decision, p. 2
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Evidence before the Planning Commission also showed the
projected total cost of Chevron's proposed service
station, for which the conditional use permit was
granted, to be approximately $175,000, exclusive of
personal property. The land value of the Chevron
parcel is estimated at $200,000.48
In support of this assertion, the Chevron referred to the
Affidavit of Helen Christiansen, Exhibits A-C, which consists
of minutes from County meetings.

The minute entry contains

Chevron's representation to the County Planning Commission of
the value of the project.

There was no foundation for the

expertise on which the cost estimate was based.49

The

representation was hearsay and was stated without oath or
knowledge.
The City moved to strike these unsupported assertions by
Chevron's counsel.

Denial of that motion and the subsequent

reliance on those assertions by the District Court, constitute
reversible error.
3.

Evidence as to Full Scope of Development.

The District

Court also erroneously concluded:
"Furthermore, the application of Chevron should be
considered a single development."
The District Court again relied upon Chevron's Memorandum
for its conclusion.

That Memorandum asserts:

"More

importantly, the Chevron parcel will be separately owned and

48

Chevron Memorandum, p. 5, para. 7

49

Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence.
23

developed; the current proposal is not part of a common
development."5 °
Again, Chevron's counsel cites no support for this
assertion.

It was made without knowledge, oath, or foundation,

and is hearsay.

It also directly contradicts verified

evidence, discussed in Point III below, which demonstrated that
the Property was being developed as a whole, and not piecemeal.
The Court's reliance on counsel's unsupported conclusions in
the face of contradictory evidence constitutes further error
and requires reversal.
4.

Evidence of Projected Costs for Entire Development.

The District Court concluded as follows concerning the
projected costs for the entire development:
"Even if Chevron's application were not considered a
single development, and were combined with McDonald's
project, the project will still not exceed $750,000.00."
The "McDonald's project," referred to by the Court, is the
second phase of development on the Property.

McDonalds' 1.3

acres, combined with the .7 acres of the Chevron project,
constitutes less than one-half of the entire development.

Yet

the Court, impliedly assumes, contrary to the evidence, that
only those two phases should be considered in determining
"projected costs" for the entire development.
The court again erred in concluding that projected costs for
Chevron and McDonalds combined would not exceed $750,000.
There was no statement, sworn or otherwise, before the Court to
50

Chevron Memorandum, p. 18
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verify that conclusion.
below, that conclusion

As will be discussed in Point III

was also

directly contrary

to

sworn

expert testimony which was before the Court.
The foregoing are only examples.

Yet, they demonstrate a

repeated reliance by the Court on unfounded speculation -- mere
fictional assertions -- which, when accepted by the Court, came
to form the basis of its decision.

Such reliance directly

violates both the rules of evidence and of civil procedure.

In

the face of such error, reversal should be ordered on appeal.
B. THE DISTRICT COURT OVERRULED OBJECTIONS BY THE CITY AND
THEREAFTER RELIED ON EVIDENCE WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT OF THOSE
OBJECTIONS AND WHICH WAS NOT TIMELY SUBMITTED AS REQUIRED BY
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE RULES OF PRACTICE FOR
DISTRICT COURT.
The District Court accepted and relied on evidence not
timely before it in making its determinations against the City.
The Rules of Civil Procedure specify the timeliness standard.
Affidavits supporting a motion for summary judgment must be
submitted at the time the moving party files the motion.

Rule

6(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
(d) A written motion, other than one which may be
heard exparte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall
be served not later than 5 days before the time
specified for the hearing, unless a different period is
fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Such an
order may for cause shown be made on ex parte
application. When a motion is supported by affidavit,
the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and,
except as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing
affidavits may be served not later than 1 day before
the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served
at some other time. [Emphasis added]
This rule is particularly important, as in this case, when
parties are submitting affidavits and other evidence on cross
25

motions for summary judgment.

The trial court must be careful

not consider affidavits submitted in opposition to one motion
for summary judgment in granting a motion for summary judgment
by another party.
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires
motions for summary judgment to be filed "at least 10 days
before the time fixed for the hearing."

Opposing affidavits

may be served at any time "prior to the day of the hearing."
Affidavits not filed within the time required by these rules
may not be received by the Court, except on stipulation of the
parties or for good cause shown.51
These rules demonstrate the intent behind requiring a party
to submit supporting affidavits with its motion.

It is to

allow the adverse party an opportunity to respond with opposing
affidavits.

If a trial court considers affidavits submitted in

opposition to a motion for summary judgment in granting the
same party's motion for summary judgment, it renders verified
response by opposing counsel impossible.
The County submitted numerous documents at the hectring
without stipulation, good cause, or even any notice to the
city.

The City objected to the introduction of these

documents,52 But the court allowed the documents into evidence
and relied on them in granting the defendants' motion for
summary judgment.
51

Rule 3(e), Rules of Practice in the Third District Court

52

Transcript, pp. 25-29
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The Court's reliance is evident in its Memorandum Decision.
For instance, the Court concluded that the first (Chevron)
phase was a single development.

It also ruled that the Chevron

and McDonald's phases combined would not exceed $750,000.
The Defendants introduced no evidence with their motions for
summary judgment which showed that the Chevron project
constituted a single development.

Yet, the Court concluded

that the Chevron project was a single development.
No evidence was submitted with Defendants' motions on the
value of the McDonald's project or of the entire development.
Yet the Court concluded that the entire costs would not exceed
$750,000.
The Court could not have reached these conclusions from
evidence submitted ten days prior to hearing as required by the
Rules of Procedure.

Its ruling was, accordingly, improper and

requires reversal.
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE
SUBMITTED BY THE CITY WHICH CREATED GENUINE ISSUES OF
MATERIAL FACT AND IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE CITY TO CONDUCT
DISCOVERY AS REQUIRED BY RULE 56(f) OF THE UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.
A. THE DISTRICT COURT REFUSED TO PERMIT THE CITY TO TAKE
DEPOSITIONS OF DEFENDANTS AND CONDUCT OTHER DISCOVERY AS
REQUESTED BY THE CITY THROUGH AFFIDAVIT OF ITS COUNSEL UNDER
AUTHORITY OF RULE 56(f) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
A motion for summary judgment should not be granted when the
nonmoving party has not completed discovery because further

27

discovery may create genuine issues of material facts
sufficient to defeat the motion.53
The party opposing summary judgment must file an affidavit
evidencing the need for further discovery.54
the

The City filed

affidavit of its counsel with the trial court previous to

the hearing on the motions for summary judgment.

The affidavit

stated, among other things, that the City was unable, after
request, to take the deposition of the defendants and was
unable^ after repeated efforts, to obtain a certified copy of
certain County Commission minutes.

The affidavit stated

further what issues of material fact the City expected to
discover.
The efforts described in the affidavit represent only the
beginning of discovery.

Focus is required for inquiry into

Chevron and McDonalds, both among the largest of world
corporations.

The City hoped to narrow the burden and scope of

discovery by first obtaining its own appraisal and then
deposing the local Property Owners.
The trial court erred in refusing to permit the steps of
discovery to commence.

The granting of summary judgment

against the City, in view of counsel's

affidavit that

information remained undiscovered, constituted error sufficient
to justify reversal of the trial court's ruling.
53

Strand v. Associated Students of University of Utah,
561 P* 2d 191 (Utah 1977); Callioux v. Progressive Insurance,
745 P. 2d 838 (Utah App. 1987).
54

Jackson v. Layton City, 743 P. 2d 1196 (Utah 1987).
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B. THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE BEFORE IT
WHICH CREATED GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT SUFFICIENT TO
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE CITY,
Summary judgment should be entered only when "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."55

"It takes

only one sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments on
the other side of the controversy and create an issue of
fact."56
On reviewing the granting of a motion for summary judgment,
an appellate court must review the record in a light most
favorable to the party against whom the motion was grantedc57
Application of these rules should have prevented summary
judgment against the City.

The following examples are

illustrative:
1.

Evidence of City "Willingness" to Annex.

As discussed previously, urban development is prohibited
within one-half mile of a city when, among other things, the
city is willing to annex the property and when cost projections
for the project exceed $750,000 for any and all phases.

Facts

were before the District Court sufficient to create issues of
material facts as to these elements.
55

Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

56

Holbrook v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975)

57

Geneva Pipe v. S & H Insurance, 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986)
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The District Court stated in its Memorandum Decision that
"Sandy City has not clearly stated it would annex the subject
property, but only that it will consider annexation."

In

forming this conclusion, the Court ignored the City's express
declaration of its willingness to annex the Property in its
Annexation Policy Declaration.,

The Court also ignored that

fact that the City's attorney had further expressly declared
City willingness before the County Planning Commission.58
2.

Evidence as to Value of the Chevron Project.

The District Court also ignored facts which create issues as
to the value and scope of the defendants' development.
The court concluded that "the projected cost of the proposed
service station project is under $750,000„"59

Contrary to this

conclusion, the City introduced a certified MAI appraisal
showing that cost of the Chevron phase, including land, site
and building improvements, tenant finish, fixtures and
equipment, was between $660,000 and $760,000.
Plainly, there was an issue of fact as to the value of the
Chevron phase of development.
3.

Evidence as to Full Scope of Development.

The District Court concluded further that "the application
of Chevron should be considered a single development."60
58

This

Salt Lake County Planning Commission Minutes, September

22, 1987
59

Memorandum Decision, p. 2

60

Memorandum Decision, p. 2
30

conclusion is contrary to evidence that the Chevron station is
part of a larger scheme of development.
The total development is 4.18 acres in size.
phase is approximately 1/6 of that acreage.

The Chevron

The Property

Owners represented to the County that the property will be a
"commercial subdivision."61

They also represented to

neighboring residents that they would be the sole developers of
the entire tract.62

Such representations create material

issues of fact which preclude summary judgment and require
reversal on appeal.
4.

Evidence of Projected Costs for Entire Development.

There was evidence sufficient to raise a material issue of fact
as to the costs of the entire development.

The cost

projections for the first two (Chevron and McDonalds) phases
alone, not including land, exceed $750,000.63

The County's own

Director of Development Services estimated the cost for
development would exceed $750,000 and expressed concern about
cutting up tracts of land to avoid annexation.64
The Court erred by concluding, in the face of such evidence,
that the total costs of development would be less than
$750,000.
61

Planning Commission minutes, April 28, 1987

62

County Commission minutes, December 95 1987 (testimony
of Pam Delehanty), p. 1588
63

Affidavit of Gary Free, MAI

64

Salt Lake County Planning Commission Minutes, September

22, 1987
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5.
Evidence as to Compliance with County Master Plan and
County Ordinances.
There was evidence sufficient to raise issues of material
facts as to whether the County acted arbitrarily when it
approved the zoning and conditional use permit for the
construction of the Chevron station.

In approving the

conditional use permit, the County Commission found, among
other things, that 1) the development was consistent with the
County Master Plan which places commercial development at
intersections, 2) the gas station was desirable for the area,
and 3) the gas station would not be detrimental to the health,
safety, and welfare of the community.
The County could not have properly concluded that the
proposed development was consistent with the County's Master
Plan.

The present Master Plan calls for rural uses at the site

of the subject property.

This fact alone should preclude the

granting of summary judgment.

The Commission stated in its

Findings that the Master Plan was outdated.

But how else can

an applicant show that a use conforms with the intent of the
master plan, as required by County Ordinance, then through the
most current plan?
Neither could the County have properly concluded that the
gas station was necessary or desirable or that it would not be
detrimental to the health, safety, and welfare of the
community.

Neither the applicant nor the County presented any

evidence to show that the gas station was necessary or
desirable or that the gas station would not create hazards.
32

Contrary to this lack of evidence, specific testimony was
given before the Planning Commission that the proposed
development would create traffic hazards and planning problems
in the area.65

The Court erred in failing to consider this

evidence which created these genuine issues of material fact.
Such error requires reversal on appeal.
Point IV
NUMEROUS PUBLIC POLICY FACTORS MITIGATE IN FAVOR OF REVERSAL
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY THE DISTRICT COURT.
The following are among the numerous public policy factors
which each mitigate in favor of summary judgment for the City:
1.

Respect of Legislative Prerogatives.

The Utah

Legislature has expressed its desire to strictly limit urban
development in unincorporated areas surrounding cities.
reasons for these restrictions are express and sound.

The

They

include the fact that (1) cities are created to provide the
high quality of urban governmental services needed for sound
development66 -- counties are not; (2) development within the
unincorporated areas of the county is a cause of "double
taxation" of city residents, an "inequity" which the
Legislature is attempting to eliminate;67 and (3) because
counties are not empowered to provide full urban services,
unincorporated development encourages the "proliferation of
65

Planning Commission minutes, September 22, 1987
(Testimony of Kent Davis, Michael Coulam, and Michael Tingey)
66

10-2-401(3), Utah Code.

67

IcL
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special service districts," which activity the Legislature is
likewise attempting to discourage.68
Because county governments are generally less able to
regulate urban development, developers have commonly sought to
develop in unincorporated areas, thus avoiding more
comprehensive review of their projects.

Salt Lake County has

encouraged such developments because development enlarges
county tax base, patronage, and political influence.

However,

such activities are directly contrary to the legislative policy
expressed in the statutes discussed above.
Due respect for the legislative prerogative in lawmaking
requires that the judiciary support enactments of the
Legislature where disagreement is founded only in policy
considerations and the legislative scheme employs reasonable
means to effectuate a legitimate objective.69

Respect for

legislative intentions mitigates in favor of a ruling requiring
the developers and county to comply with the urban development
restrictions of state statute.
2.

Balancing of Interests.

Defendants' development does

not just bring into conflict the interests of Salt Lake County
and Sandy City.

Their development is posed directly adjacent

to residential neighborhoods where residents and property
owners have met and expressed strong views both for and against
68

Id.

69

Utah Technology Finance Corp. v. Wilkinson, 39 Utah
Advance Reports 15, 19 (1986)
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the development.

Further, the property abuts two major

arterial streets, and thus poses potential traffic problems for
both Sandy City and Salt Lake County,
Orderly administrative procedures, whose proper purpose is
the final settlement of controversies, is favored by the
courts.70

State statute provides a process whereby such

disputes may
process.

be resolved -- it begins with the annexation

Through that process, public hearings are held,

citizens are heard, service delivery efficiencies can be
maximized, and competing interests can be accommodated.
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that city government is an
appropriate forum for balancing interests and resolving
disputes between residents and developers.71

This Court should

likewise give deference to the statutory annexation process in
order that these policies may be effectuated.
3.

Balance of Powers Principles.

The Utah Supreme Court

has asked trial courts to refer questions, that are

properly

committed to other branches of government, to the appropriate
administrative process, in order that the powers of other
branches of government will not be impinged.72

The process

which has been defined for resolving this dispute is the
annexation process.
70

Bandy v. Century Equipment Co., Inc., 692 P.2d 754
(Utah 1984)
71

Loveland v. Orem City, 70 Utah Adv. Rep. 2, 7 (1987)

72

Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 65 Utah
Advance Reports 8, 11-12 (1987)
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This Court will promote balance of powers principles by
requiring defendants' compliance with the annexation process,
which process is defined and executed through the legislative
powers of this state.73
CONCLUSION
This brief is written, with respect for both the judiciary
and the district judge who rendered the decision from which
appeal has been taken.

It is unfortunate that a summary

judgment was rendered in the lower court which contained
numerous errors of both law and material fact.
This case will produce a precedent critical to the
development of this state.

This is because the principle means

by which urban services are extended to developing areas is
through extension of city boundaries.

Large scale urban

development within unincorporated islands and around City
fringes, make annexation difficult or impossible.

It also

encourages double taxation and the proliferation of service
districts, contrary to legislative policy.
The District Court has ruled in a manner which permits large
scale development to be approved in unincorporated fringe
areas, in contradiction to both state statutes and county
ordinances, without meaningful opportunity for the City to
respond.

Such errors, both of law and material fact, require

reversal on appeal.

73

Freeman v. Centerville City, 600 P.2d 1003, 1004 (Utah

1979)
36

DATED this ^

day of August, 1988.

WALTER R. MILLER
Sandy City Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that 4 true and correct copies of the
above and foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed postage
prepaid this J& ^day of August, 1988, to the offices of each of
the following:
Brinton R. Burbidge
Attorney for Defendants
Yeates, Priest, Kjar and Smoot
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599
Leonard J. Lewis
Attorney for Chevron U.S.A.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Kent S. Lewis
Attorney for Salt Lake County
and its Planning Commission
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office
2001 South State Street, #S3600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200

37

ADDENDUM

Addendum 1A

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party* A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.

Addendum IB

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 6. Time,
(a) Computation, In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by
these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the
period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day
which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time
prescribed or allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or
by order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1)
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any
action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g),
except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of time provided for the
doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by
the continued existence or expiration of a term of court. The continued existence or expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power of a court to
do any act or take any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending
before it.
(d) For motions — Affidavits. A written motion, other than one which
may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not
later than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different
period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Such an order may for
cause shown be made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported by
affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later than 1
day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at some
other time.
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the
right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the
notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the
prescribed period.

Rules of Practice in the Third District Court
of the State of Utah
Rule 3, Law and motion calendar.
Rules 2.7 and 2.8 of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts of the State
of Utah shall not apply to motions filed in the Third Judicial District Court.
(a) All law and motion matters will be heard by the judge assigned to the
case. These matters will be set on a regular law and motion calendar as
arranged with the clerk of the judge assigned to the case. Ex parte matters
based upon stipulation will be presented only to the judge assigned to the
case.
(b) Counsel shall contact the court and receive a date for hearing on the
regular law and motion calendar, or may file a written request that the matter be resolved without hearing based upon the briefs submitted.
(c) Orders to show cause and other matters requiring written notice will be
heard only after written notice, which shall be served not less than five (5)
days prior to the date specified in the notice for hearing, unless the court for
good cause shown shall by order shorten the time for notice of hearing.
(d) Motions based upon depositions or supported thereby shall not be heard
unless the depositions are filed in the clerk's office at least forty-eight (48)
hours before the hearing on the said motion.
(e) Affidavits not filed within the time required by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure shall not be received, except on stipulation of the parties or for good
cause shown. Courtesy copies of all affidavits shall be given to the judge
within the time limits required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
shall indicate the date upon which the matter is set for hearing. Such copy
shall be clearly marked as a courtesy copy, and shall not be filed with the
clerk of the court
(f) All motions except uncontested or ex parte matters may be accompanied
by a brief statement of points and authorities, and any affidavits relied upon
in support thereof. Points and authorities supporting or opposing a motion
shall not exceed five (5) pages in length, exclusive of the statement of material
facts as hereinafter provided, except as waived by order of the court on ex
parte application.
(g) The points and authorities in support of a dispositive motion shall begin
with a section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which
the movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in
separate numbered sentences, and shall refer with particularity to those portions of the record upon which the movant relies.
(h) The points and authorities in opposition to a dispositive motion shall
begin with a section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to
which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each fact in dispute shall be
stated in separate numbered sentences, and shall refer j^ith particularity to
those portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies and, if
applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's
facts that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the statement of the
movant shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment,
unless specifically controverted by the statement of the opposing party.
(i) If a memorandum of points and authorities is filed in support of a motion
it must be served on the opposing party or his counsel and filed with the court
no later than ten (10) days before the date set for hearing. If a responsive
memorandum is filed it shall be served upon the opposing party or counsel no
later than five (5) days before the date of hearing.
(j) A courtesy copy of all memoranda of points and authorities filed by
counsel shall be served upon the judge hearing the matter at least two working days before the date set for hearing, and shall indicate the date upon
which the matter is set for hearing. Such copy shall be clearly marked as a
courtesy copy, and shall not be filed with the clerk of the court.
(k) The court in civil matters on its motion or at a party's request may
direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without court appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all such telephone arguments and
the rulings thereon if requested by any counsel.

Addendum ID

Utah Code Annotated
10-2-418. Urban development restrictions.
Urban development shall not be approved or permitted within one-half mile
of a municipality in the unincorporated territory which the municipality has
proposed for municipal expansion in its policy declaration, if a municipality is
willing to annex the territory proposed for such development under the standards and requirements set forth in this chapter; provided, however, that a
property owner desiring to develop or improve property within the said onehalf mile area may notify the municipality in writing of said desire and identify with particularity all legal and factual barriers preventing an annexation
to the municipality. At the end of 12 consecutive months from the filing with
the municipality of said notice and after a good faith and diligent effort by
said property owner to annex, said property owner may develop as otherwise
permitted by law. Urban development beyond one-half mile of a municipality
may be restricted or an impact statement required when agreed to in an
interlocal agreement, under the provisions of the Interlocal Co-operation Act.

Utah Code Annotated

10-1-104. Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) "Municipal" or "municipalities" means any city of the first class,
city of the second class, city of the third class, or town in the state of Utah,
but unless the context otherwise provides, the term or terms do not include counties, school districts, or any other special purpose governments.
(2) "Governing body" means collectively the legislative body and the
executive of any municipality. Unless otherwise provided:
(a) In cities of the first and second class, the governing body is the
city commission;
(b) In cities of the third class, the governing body is the city council;
(c) In towns the governing body is the town council.
(3) "City" shall include cities of the first class, cities of the second class
or cities of the third class or may refer cumulatively to all such cities.
(4) "Town" means any town as defined in § 10-2-301.
(5) "Recorder," unless clearly inapplicable, shall include and apply to
town clerks.
(6) "Provisions of law" shall include other statutes of the state of Utah
and ordinances, rules and regulations properly adopted by any municipality unless the construction is clearly contrary to the intent of state law.
(7) "Contiguous" means abutting directly on the existing boundary of
the annexing municipality. "Directly" includes separation by a street,
alley, public right-of-way, creek, river or the right-of-way of a railroad or
other public service corporation, or by lands owned by the municipality,
by some other political subdivision of the state or by the state.
(8) "Affected entities" means a county, municipality or other entity
possessing taxation powers within a county, whose territory, service delivery or revenue will be directly and significantly affected by a proposed
boundary change involving a municipality or other local entity.
(9) "Peninsula" means an area of unincorporated territory surrounded
on more than one-half of its boundary distance, but not completely, by
incorporated territory and situated so that the length of a line drawn
across the unincorporated area from an incorporated area to an incorporated area on the opposite side shall be less than 25% of the total aggregate boundaries of the unincorporated area.
(10) "Island" means unincorporated territory completely surrounded by
incorporated area of one or more municipalities.
(11) "Urban development" means a housing subdivision involving
more than 15 residential units with an average of less than one acre per
residential unit or a commercial or industrial development for which cost
projections exceed $750,000 for any or all phases.

Salt Lake County Ordinances

19.84.030 Application requirements—Fee.
A. Application for a conditional use permit
shall be made by the property owner or certified
agent thereof to the planning commission
B Accompanying Documents. Detailed site
plans drawn to scale and other drawings necessary to assist the planning commission in arriving at an appropnate decision.
C. Fee. The fee for an\ conditional use permit
shall be as provided for in Section 3 52.040 ot
this code. (Pnor code $22-31-2(1)—(3))

Chapter 19.84
CONDITIONAL USES
Sections:
19.84.010
19.84.020
19.84.030
19.84.040
19.84.050
19.84.060
19.84.070
19.84.080
19.84.090
19.84.100
19.84.110
19.84.120
19.84.130
19.84.140

Purpose.
Conditional use permit
required when.
Application requirements—
Fee.
Public hearing.
Determination of commission.
Delegation of approval
authorit}.
Policies established.
Re>iew b\ planning
commission.
Conditions for approval.
Appeal of planning director
decision.
Appeal of planning commission
decision.
Inspection,
Time limit.
Sale of alcoholic beverages.

19.84.040 Public hearing.
No public heanng need be held. however a
heanng may be held when the planning commission shall deem such a heanng to be necessary in
the public interest.
A. The planning commission may delegate to
the planning director the holding of the heanng
B The planning director shall submit to the
planning commission a record of the heanng.
together with a report of findings and recommendations relative thereto, for the consideration ot
the planning commission
C. Such hearing, if deemed necessary. shall be
held not more than thirty days trom the date of
application. The panicular time and place shall
be established by the planning director
D The planning director shall publish a
notice of heanng in a newspaper of general circulation in the county noi less than ten da\ s pnor
to the date of the heanng. Failure of property
owners to receive notice of the heanng shall in no
way affect the validity of action taken. (Prior
code §22-31-2(4))

19.84.010 Purpose.
The purpose of this chapter is to allow the
proper integration into the county of uses which
ma\ be suitable only in certain locations in the
county or zoning distnct. or only if such uses are
designed or laid out on the site in a panicular
manner. (Pnor code § 22-31-1)
19.84.020

Conditional use permit required
when.
A conditional use permit shall be required for
all uses listed as conditional uses in the distnct
regulations or elsewhere in this title. A conditional use permit may be revoked upon failure in
compliance with conditions precedent to the
onginal approval of the permit. (Pnor code §
22-3i-2(part))

19.84.050 Determination of commission.
The planning commission may permit a conditional use to be located within any distnct in
which the panicular conditional use is permitted
by the use regulations of this title In authonzinz
any conditional use the planning commission
shall impose such requirements and conditions
as required by law and am additional conditions
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19.84.050

as may be necessary for the protection of adjacent properties and the public welfare. Such conditions of approval may include but shall not be
limited to limitations or requirements as to the
height, size, location and design of structures,
landscaping, density, ingress-egress, fencing,
parking or lighting. Height, density and size
requirements for structures in each zone are
maximums and may be reduced or modified as
conditions to the approval of any conditional use
application. (Ord. of 5/29/85: prior code §
22-31-2(5)(part))

B. That such use will not. under the circumstances of the particular case, be detrimental to
the health, safety or general welfare of persons
residing or working in the vicinity, or injurious to
property or improvements in the vicinity: and
C. That the proposed use will comply with the
regulations and conditions specified in this title
for such use: and
D. That the proposed use will conform to the
intent of the county master plan. (Prior code >J
22-31-2(5)(pan))
19.84.100

Appeal of planning director
decision.
Any person shall have the right to appeal the
decision of the planning director to the planning
commission by filing a letter with the planning
commission within five days of the planning
director's action, stating the reason for the appeal
and requesting a hearing before the planning
commission at the earliest regular meeting of the
commission. (Prior code § 22-3l-2(5)(part))

19.84.060 Delegation of approval authority.
The planning commission may delegate to the
planning director the authority to approve, modify or deny all or part of the conditional uses set
forth in this title. (Prior code § 22-31-2(5)(part))
19.84.070 Policies established.
The planning commission shall establish policies regarding landscaping, fencing, lighting,
ingress-egress, height of buildings. etc.. to guide
the decision of the planning director to ensure
consistency in the issuance of conditional use
permits. (Prior code § 22-31-2(5)(pan))

19.84.110

Appeal of planning commission
decision.
A. Any person shall ha\ e the right to appeal to
the board of county commissioners an\ decision
rendered by the planning commission b> filing in
writing, and in triplicate, stating the reasons for
the appeal .with the board of county commissioners within ten days following the date upon
which the decision is made by the planning commission. After receiving the appeal the county
commission may reaffirm the planning commission decision or set a date for a public hearing.
B. Notification of Planning Commission.
The board of county commissioners shall notif>
the planning commission of the date of the
review, in writing, at least seven days preceding
the date set for hearing so that the planning commission may prepare the record for the hearing.
C. Determination by Board of County Commissioners. The board of county commissioners
after proper review of the decision of the planning commission may affirm, reverse, alter or

19.84.080 Review by planning commission.
The planning director is authorized to bring
any conditional use permit application before
the planning commission if. in his opinion, the
general public interest will be better served by
review of the planning commission. (Prior code §
22-3l-2(5)(part))
19.84.090 Conditions for approval.
The planning commission shall not authorize
a conditional use permit unless the evidence presented is such as to establish:
A. That the proposed use at the particular
location is necessary or desirable to provide a
service or facility which will contribute to the
general well-being of the neighborhood and the
communitv: and
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19.84.110

remand for further review and consideration any
action taken by the planning commission. (Prior
code § 22-3 l-2(5)(part))

2. That the proposed use at a particular location is necessary and desirable to provide the
service or facility which will contribute to the
general well-being of the neighborhood and the
community; and
3. That such use will not. under the circumstances of the particular case, be detrimental to
the health, safety or general welfare of persons
residing or working in the vicinity, or injurious to
property or improvements in the vicinity: and
4. That the proposed use will comply with
regulations and conditions specified in this title
for such use: and
5. That the proposed use will conform to the
intent of the county master plan.
B. All conditional use permits for uses dispensig alcoholic beverages to be consumed on the
premises are subject to an annual review, and all
applications for a conditional use permit for consumption ofliquororbeeron the premises must
be accompanied by a payment of fees as provided
in Section 3.52.040. The fees are considered reasonable because of the costs of investigation and
studies necessary for the administration hereof.
C. The granting of any permit by the planning
commission to dispense alcoholic beverages is
subject to review by the county commission. The
denial of any permit by the planning commission
to dispense alcoholic beverages is subject to
review by the district courts. All appeals of planning commission decisions to the board of county commissioners or the district courts must be
filed with the appropriate body within thirty days
from the date of the planning commission decision. (Ord. 804, 1982: prior code § 22-31-4)

19.84.120 Inspection.
Following the issuance of a conditional use
permit by the planning commission the director
of building inspection shall approve an application for a building permit pursuant to Chapter
19.94 of this title and shall ensure that development is undertaken and completed in compliance with the permits. (Prior code §
22-31-2(5)(part))
19.84.130 Time limit.
Unless there is a substantial action under a
conditional use permit within a maximum
period of one year of its issuance, the conditional
use permit shall expire. The planning commission may grant a maximum extension of six
months under exceptional circumstances. (Prior
code § 22-31-2(5)(part))
19.84.140 Sale of alcoholic beverages.
A. The planning commission shall authorize
a conditional use permit to sell alcoholic beverages except Class A beer outlets and Class B
beer outlets where it is determined by the planning commission:
1. That the use is not in the immediate proximity of any school, church, library, public playground, or park:
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Addendum 2

Walter R. Miller, #2268
Sandy City Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
440 East 8680 South
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801) 566-1561
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SANDY CITY, a municipal
corporation,
Plaintiff,
AFFIDAVIT OF
WALTER R. MILLER

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, political
subdivision of the State of
Utah, SALT LAKE COUNTY
PLANNING COMMISSION, K.
DELYN YEATES, R. SCOTT
PRIEST, W. SCOTT KJAR,
STEVEN E. SMOOT, POSTEROBLECKER, INC., and CHEVRON
U.S.A. INC.,

Civil No. C87-07304

Honorable Raymond S. Uno

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)
:

SS

County of Salt Lake)
WALTER R. MILLER, being first duly sworn upon oath,
deposes and says:
1.

He is the duly appointed City Attorney for Sandy

City (hereinafter "City") and has held this position since May
1, 1986.

Affiant has practiced as an attorney and a member of

the Utah State Bar since 1972.

Previous to his appointment as

City Attorney, affiant has served in several public positions

including staff attorney for the U.S. Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C. and Deputy City Attorney (Chief of the Civil
Division) for Salt Lake City Corporation.
2.

Affiant's duties as City Attorney include

representation of the City in legal actions against it.

In

this capacity, affiant serves as counsel of record for the City
in the above-entitled action.
3.

By letter dated November 19, 1987, affiant

inquired of Defendant's counsel, as to a convenient date for
Defendant K. Delyn Yeates' deposition.
not respond to that inquiry.

Defendant's counsel did

A copy of affiant's letter of

inquiry is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
4.

Affiant has been informed that some information

sought by the City in this action will eventually be made a
public record, which will be available for the City informally
and outside of regular discovery process.

One such document,

minutes of the County Commission meeting of December 9, 1987,
contains information as to the scope, costs and impact of
development of the property, which is critical to the City's
case.

Affiant has twice sought a certified copy of such

minutes for court purposes but has been informed by the County
Commission Clerk that the minutes have not yet been approved by
the County Commission.

The clerk informed affiant that the

minutes are not scheduled for approval until February 8, 1988.
5.

Aside from discovery from other parties, the City

has initiated study and public review of appropriate
2

development which relate to this action and have invited
Defendants to participate in this review.

Such study and

review is currently underway but has not yet been completed.
Affiant believes such study and review will produce
information vital to prosecution of this action.
6.

Discovery by the City is incomplete in this action

and affiant is of the opinion, based on information and belief,
that information sought in discovery will create genuine issues
of material fact sufficient to defeat Defendants' motions for
summary judgment, including but not limited to the following:
a.

That zoning and proposed uses for the

property contradict the County master plan and that
insufficient evidence was presented to the County Planning
Commission to demonstrate conformity with that plan, as
required by County ordinance.
bo

That the proposed zoning and use is

unnecessary or undesirable or will not contribute to the
general well-being of the neighborhood and community and that
evidence concerning such subjects was not appropriately
presented by Defendants to County officials, as required by
County ordinance.
c.

That the zoning and proposed uses will be

detrimental to the health, safety or general welfare of persons
residing or working in the vicinity, or injurious to property
or improvements in the vicinity, and that evidence of such

3

matters was not appropriately presented to County officials as
required by ordinance.
d.

That the true scope, costs and impact of

development, in all phases, for the property, including but not
limited to land acquisition and improvement, financing, general
construction, fixturing, development fees and service
connections, as known to Defendant developers, were not fully
and accurately communicated to County officials during the
decision-making process.
e.

That Defendants' "commercial subdivision" was

not platte.d and approved as required by state statute and that
all evidence will be consistent in demonstrating that the costs
of development of that subdivision substantially exceed
$750,000.
7.

The document attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a

true and correct copy of objections filed with Salt Lake
County, by affiant on behalf of the City.
DATED this

day of February, 1988.

Walter R. Miller
City Attorney
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
February, 1988.

day of

Notary Public, Residing in
Salt Lake County, Utah
My Commission Expires:
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Addendum 3

Walter R. Miller, #2268
Sandy City Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
440 East 8680 South
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801) 566-1561
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SANDY CITY, a municipal
corporation,

:

Plaintiff,

MOTION TO STRIKE

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, political'
subdivision of the State of
Utah, SALT LAKE COUNTY
PLANNING COMMISSION, K.
DELYN YEATES, R. SCOTT
PRIEST, W. SCOTT KJAR,
STEVEN E. SMOOT, POSTEROBLECKER, INC., and CHEVRON
U.S.A. INC.,

:

Civil No. C87-07304

:
:
:

Honorable Raymond S. Uno

Defendants.
Plaintiff Sandy City respectfully moves the Court
pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for
an Order striking the affidavit, portions of motion and
memorandum referred to in this Motion, which affidavit,
memorandum and motion were submitted by Defendants in support
of their motions for summary judgment.

This motion is based on

the failure of said documents to conform to the requirements of
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rules 603, 701,

702, 802 and 805 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, as more fully
set forth in the attached summary of objections.
DATED this

day of January, 1988.

Walter R. Miller
City Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff

2

SUMMARY OF OBJECTIONS TO
DOCUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Document
otion for Summary
idgment - Yeates,
riest, Kjar, & Smoot
^morandum in Support
f Chevron's Motion
or Summary Judgment

Paragraph

Allegation

Objection

Page 2
Para. 2

Dates of Rezoning
and Purchase

No foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

701 U.R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C

Page 2
Para. 1

Public Hearings

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

701 U.R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C

County Commission
Approval

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

701 U.R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C

Application by
Defendants

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

701 U.R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C

Legal Description

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

702 U.R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C

Page 3
Para. 2

Efforts by Defendants

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

701 U.R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C

Page 4
Para. 3

Date of Ord. Publication
Lack of Objection to
Rezoning

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

701 U.R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C

Page 3
Para. 1

Rule

Page 4
Para. 4

Postero-Blecker an
Agent

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

702 U.R.E
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C.P.

Page 4
Para. 4

Purpose of Application

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

701 U.R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C.P.

Page 4
Para. 5

Public Hearings
Evidence Considered

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

701 U.R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C.P

Page 4
Para. 6

Evidence Generally

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

701 U.R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C.P.

Page 4
Para. 7

Evidence as to Value

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

702 U.R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C.P.

Page 4
Para. 8

District Plan and
Related Growth and
Development

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Otah

701 U.R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.E.

Page 4
Para. 10

Denial of City ApJpeal

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

701 U.R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C.P.

Page 7
Para. 1
and 2

Notice of Hearing
Failure to Object

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

701 U.R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C.P.

Page 8
Para. 1

Compliance with
Procedures

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

702 U.R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C.P.

Page 9
Para. 1

Evidence before
Commission

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

701 U.R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C.P.

Page 11
Para. 1

Evidence at Hearing
Council "Jurisdiction"

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

701 U.R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C.P.

Page 12
Para. 1

History of Plan
Growth and Change

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

701 U.R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C.P.

Page 14
Para. 1

Approval of Decision

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

701 U.R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C.P.

Page 14
Para. 3

Willingness to Annex
Not Expressed
Cost of Development

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

701 U.R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C.P.

Page 15
Para. 2

Expressions by City
Concerning Annexation

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

701 U.R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C.P.

Page 16
Para. 1

No Commitment to Annex

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

701 U.R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C.P.

Page 18
Para. 1

Costs of Project

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

702 U„R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C.P.

Page 18
Para. 2

Future Development
Not Common Development

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

701 U.R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C.P.

Affidavit of Helen
J. Christiansen

Page 19
Para. 2

Jurisdictions of County
And City

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

702 U.R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C.P,

Page 20
Para. 1

Expense and Efforts

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

701 U.R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C.P

Page 20
Para. 2

"Good Faith" Efforts
By Chevron

No Foundation
Hearsay
No Know or Oath

701 U.R.E.
802 U.R.E.
56(e) U.R.C.P

This affidavit and attached exhibits are objected to to the extent they
are used to establish any of the allegations set forth above on the grounds
specified in this summary.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SANDY CITY, a municipal
corporation of the State of
Utah,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO. C-87-7304

Plaintiff,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of
Utah, et al.,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs

and defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment

came before this Court on the 5th day of February, 1988.
parties were represented by respective counsel.
the Court took the matter under advisement.

All

After argument,

On the 25th day of

February, 1988, Salt Lake County^ Motion for Certification of
Record

came before this Court.

The matter was taken under

advisement, subject to plaintiff supplementing the record.

After

reviewing the file, Memoranda, record and arguments, the Court
finds as follows.
1.

Salt Lake County Commission acted properly in rezoning

the property in question, and was not in violation of any county
ordinance or county master plan, and did not act arbitrarily and
capriciously.

Furthermore, Sandy City appears to have waived its

right to object to rezoning.

SANDY CITY V. COUNTY

2.

Salt

Lake

PAGE TWO

County

County Commission properly

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Planning

is necessary

general welfare.
acted

properly

and

Salt

Lake

issued a conditional use permit for

development of the subject property.
facts,

Commission

The project, based on the

and desirable, and not detrimental to the

Furthermore, the defendant Chevron Incorporated
in processing

its application

through

body with jurisdiction at the time, Salt Lake County.

the

only

Sandy City

did not have jurisdiction to accept the application.
Defendants1

3.

actions

do

not

violate

Utah

Code Ann.,

Section 10-2-418.
(a)

Defendants' development does not constitute "urban

development" proposed within a restricted, unincorporated area.
(b)

Sandy City has not clearly stated it would annex

the subject property, but only that it will consider annexation.
It was not until the present lawsuit was filed that it indicated
that

it

would

annex

the

subject

property.

Even

if

Chevron

petitioned

for annexation and Sandy City annexed, there is no

assurance

Sandy

City

would

approve

Chevron's

application.

Furthermore, Chevron is not required to petition Sandy City for
annexation.
(c)

The value of the fixtures and personal

should not be considered.

property

The projected cost of the proposed

service station project is under $750,000.00.

Furthermore, the

application of Chevron should be considered a single development.

SANDY CITY V. COUNTY

(d)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE THREE

Even if Chevron's application were not considered

a single development, and were combined with McDonald's project,
the project will still not exceed $750,000.00e
(e)
procedures

At this time

for approval

Chevron has taken all the necessary

of their application, and is ready to

proceed with their project.
4.
Salt

Based on the facts before the Court, it appears that

Lake

County

Commission

has

conducted

comported with all due process requirements.

a

hearing

that

It appears to have

acted within the scope of its authority, has conducted hearings,
and arrived at a decision, and does not appear to have acted in
excess of its authority, or in a manner so clearly outside reason
that

its

action

must

be

deemed

capricious

and

arbitrary.

Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, 555 P.2d
281 (1976).
5.

Accordingly, it is the opinion of this Court that Sandy

City's Motion to Strike should be denied, and Sandy City's Motion
for Summary Judgment should be denied.

Furthermore, all of the

defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and Salt Lake County's
Motion

for

Certification

should

be

granted.

Counsel

defendant Chevron is to prepare an Order for the Court's

for

SANDY CITY V. COUNTY

signature.

PAGE FOUR

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Said Order should be approved as to form by all

parties,
Dated this

. f\

i£^
I ^3

day of March, 1988.

RAYMC
10ND S . UNO
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Addendum 5

FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE
.1
•JM

Salt Lake Cou!-.7
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Leonard J. Lewis, #1947
John W. Andrews,
#4724
Attorneys for Chevron USA, Inc.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SANDY CITY, a municipal
corporation of the State
of Utah,
Plaintiff,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF
DISMISSAL

vs.
Civil No. C87-7304
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of
Utah, SALT LAKE COUNTY
PLANNING COMMISSION, K.
DELYN YEATES, R. SCOTT
PRIEST, W. SCOTT KJAR,
STEVEN E. SMOOT, POSTEROBLECKER, INC., and CHEVRON
U.S.A., INC.,

Honorable Raymond Uno

Defendants.
The following matters came on for hearing before the
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, District Judge, on Friday, the 5th
day of February 1988, at 2:00 p.m.: (1) Defendant Chevron
U.S.A., Inc.'s Motion For Summary Judgment; (2) Defendants Salt
Lake County and Salt Lake County Planning Commission's Motion
For Summary Judgment; (3) Defendants Smoot, Kjar, Priest and
Yeates' Motion For Summary Judgment; (4) Plaintiff Sandy City's

Motion For Summary Judgment; and (5) Plaintiff Sandy City's
Motion To Strike.

Leonard J, Lewis and John W. Andrews

appeared on behalf of defendant Chevron U.S.A., Inc.; Kent S.
Lewis appeared on behalf of defendants Salt Lake County and
Salt Lake County Planning Commission; Brinton R. Burbidge
appeared on behalf of defendants Smoot, Kjar, Priest and
Yeates; and Walter R. Miller appeared on behalf of plaintiff
Sandy City.
The Court having reviewed the record and the memoranda
and arguments of the parties, and good cause appearing, it is
hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:
(1)

Plaintiff Sandy City's Motion For Summary

Judgment and Motion To Strike are denied;
(2)

It appearing that no material issues of fact

exist, and that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter
of law, defendants' Motions For Summary Judgment are hereby
granted.

It is hereby ordered that the Verified Complaint of

Sandy City in this action and all causes of action contained
therein be stricken, and this action be and hereby is dismissed
with prejudice.

/

DATED this ^

~~ day of April, 1988.

_^^

BY THE COURT:

Raymond S. Uno
B^-W *

^ ^

Qopuiy C rk

D i s t r i c t Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

VAN GOTT, BAGLEY< CORNWALL
& MCCARTHY
Leonard J. Lewis, Esq.
John W. Andrews, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendant
Chevron U.S.A.,Inc.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

Kent S. Lewis, Esq.
Deputy County Attorney
Attorney for Salt Lake County
Defendants
2001 South State Street
#53600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200

5747A

-3-

Walter R. Miller, Esq.
Sandy City Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
440 East 8680 South
Sandy, Utah 84070

n
Brinton R. Burbidge, Esq.
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Defendants
Smoot, Kjar, Priest and Yeates
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

